| SETTING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE TARGETS: DO POOR PERFORMERS GIVE UP? | |
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MedLine Citation:
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PMID: 22302418 Owner: NLM Status: Publisher |
Abstract/OtherAbstract:
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We examine the effect of a health plan's pay for performance incentives on the percentage of outpatient drug prescriptions that are filled with generic rather than brand-name drugs in physicians' practices in an established physician network - the generic prescription rate (GPR). The financial reward was based on the performance of the entire network, but the network implemented rewards at the practice level. Practice-level rewards were awarded on an all-or-nothing basis if the GPR met or exceeded specialty-specific targets that increased each year. Although that design gave the practices a strong incentive to meet the target, practices performing far below the target might 'give up', costing the network its reward. Using a partial adjustment model, we estimate that in the absence of pay for performance, the average equilibrium value of GPR was 58.3%. We estimate that GPR would be maximized if the target were set at 77%. The GPR-maximizing target would induce an improvement in average GPR from 58.3% to 65.8% or 7.5 percentage points. When the target is set above 80%, practices with equilibrium GPR below 58.3% will 'give up' in the sense that they will not improve relative to their equilibrium value. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
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Authors:
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Bryan Dowd; Roger Feldman; William Nersesian |
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Publication Detail:
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Type: JOURNAL ARTICLE Date: 2012-2-2 |
Journal Detail:
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Title: Health economics Volume: - ISSN: 1099-1050 ISO Abbreviation: - Publication Date: 2012 Feb |
Date Detail:
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Created Date: 2012-2-3 Completed Date: - Revised Date: - |
Medline Journal Info:
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Nlm Unique ID: 9306780 Medline TA: Health Econ Country: - |
Other Details:
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Languages: ENG Pagination: - Citation Subset: - |
Copyright Information:
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Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
Affiliation:
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Division of Health Policy and Management, School of Public Health, University of Minnesota, USA. dowdx001@umn.edu. |
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From MEDLINE®/PubMed®, a database of the U.S. National Library of Medicine
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