| Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. | |
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MedLine Citation:
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PMID: 15565153 Owner: NLM Status: MEDLINE |
Abstract/OtherAbstract:
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Models of large-scale human cooperation take two forms. 'Indirect reciprocity' occurs when individuals help others in order to uphold a reputation and so be included in future cooperation. In 'collective action', individuals engage in costly behaviour that benefits the group as a whole. Although the evolution of indirect reciprocity is theoretically plausible, there is no consensus about how collective action evolves. Evidence suggests that punishing free riders can maintain cooperation, but why individuals should engage in costly punishment is unclear. Solutions to this 'second-order free rider problem' include meta-punishment, mutation, conformism, signalling and group-selection. The threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory. Here, we show that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem because punishers can withhold help from free riders without damaging their reputations. However, we also show that such a strategy cannot invade a population in which indirect reciprocity is not linked to collective action, thus leaving unexplained how collective action arises. |
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Authors:
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Karthik Panchanathan; Robert Boyd |
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Publication Detail:
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Type: Journal Article; Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S. |
Journal Detail:
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Title: Nature Volume: 432 ISSN: 1476-4687 ISO Abbreviation: Nature Publication Date: 2004 Nov |
Date Detail:
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Created Date: 2004-11-26 Completed Date: 2004-12-23 Revised Date: 2006-11-15 |
Medline Journal Info:
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Nlm Unique ID: 0410462 Medline TA: Nature Country: England |
Other Details:
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Languages: eng Pagination: 499-502 Citation Subset: IM |
Affiliation:
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Center for Behavior, Evolution, and Culture and Department of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095, USA. buddha@ucla.edu |
Export Citation:
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APA/MLA Format Download EndNote Download BibTex |
| MeSH Terms | |
Descriptor/Qualifier:
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Cooperative Behavior* Evolution* Group Processes* Humans Models, Psychological Mutation Punishment Research Design Social Conformity |
| Comments/Corrections | |
Comment In:
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Nature. 2004 Nov 25;432(7016):449-50
[PMID:
15565133
]
Nature. 2005 Sep 22;437(7058):E8; discussion E8-9 [PMID: 16177738 ] |
From MEDLINE®/PubMed®, a database of the U.S. National Library of Medicine
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