| Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives. | |
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MedLine Citation:
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PMID: 21843530 Owner: NLM Status: Publisher |
Abstract/OtherAbstract:
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The one-shot public goods game is extended to include institutional incentives (i.e. reward and/or punishment) that are meant to promote cooperation. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcomes predict either partial or fully cooperative behavior in these extended multi-player games with a continuous strategy space. Furthermore, for some incentive schemes, multiple NE outcomes are shown to emerge. Stability of all these equilibria under standard evolutionary dynamics (i.e. the replicator equation and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics) is characterized. |
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Authors:
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Ross Cressman; Jie-Wen Song; Bo-Yu Zhang; Yi Tao |
Publication Detail:
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Type: JOURNAL ARTICLE Date: 2011-8-12 |
Journal Detail:
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Title: Journal of theoretical biology Volume: - ISSN: 1095-8541 ISO Abbreviation: - Publication Date: 2011 Aug |
Date Detail:
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Created Date: 2011-8-16 Completed Date: - Revised Date: - |
Medline Journal Info:
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Nlm Unique ID: 0376342 Medline TA: J Theor Biol Country: - |
Other Details:
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Languages: ENG Pagination: - Citation Subset: - |
Copyright Information:
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Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. |
Affiliation:
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Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. |
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From MEDLINE®/PubMed®, a database of the U.S. National Library of Medicine
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