Document Detail

Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives.
MedLine Citation:
PMID:  21843530     Owner:  NLM     Status:  MEDLINE    
The one-shot public goods game is extended to include institutional incentives (i.e. reward and/or punishment) that are meant to promote cooperation. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcomes predict either partial or fully cooperative behavior in these extended multi-player games with a continuous strategy space. Furthermore, for some incentive schemes, multiple NE outcomes are shown to emerge. Stability of all these equilibria under standard evolutionary dynamics (i.e. the replicator equation and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics) is characterized.
Ross Cressman; Jie-Wen Song; Bo-Yu Zhang; Yi Tao
Publication Detail:
Type:  Journal Article; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't     Date:  2011-08-11
Journal Detail:
Title:  Journal of theoretical biology     Volume:  299     ISSN:  1095-8541     ISO Abbreviation:  J. Theor. Biol.     Publication Date:  2012 Apr 
Date Detail:
Created Date:  2012-03-09     Completed Date:  2012-05-01     Revised Date:  2014-03-25    
Medline Journal Info:
Nlm Unique ID:  0376342     Medline TA:  J Theor Biol     Country:  England    
Other Details:
Languages:  eng     Pagination:  144-51     Citation Subset:  IM    
Copyright Information:
Copyright © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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MeSH Terms
Biological Evolution*
Cooperative Behavior*
Game Theory*
Group Processes
Models, Genetic*

From MEDLINE®/PubMed®, a database of the U.S. National Library of Medicine

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