Motivational traps.
Abstract: The current paper describes an approach for talking with safety professionals or other practitioners about the behavioral foundations of common health and safety problems. Four kinds of Motivational Traps for bad habits are reviewed (Pay-Off, Rare Events, Effort, and Sneaky Traps). This practical taxonomy lives in the introductory slides of the author's presentations for lay audiences, and over the years, most technical language has been "selected out," while more catchy language has survived. The topic is helpful for getting audience members on the hook early during presentations, and given the common origins of many behavioral problems, the approach may be useful for other behavior analysts who are engaged in the process of marketing behavioral management techniques.

Keywords: motivation, health, safety, prevention, practical advice, technical language
Article Type: Report
Subject: Human acts (Research)
Human behavior (Research)
Motivation (Psychology) (Research)
Author: Olson, Ryan
Pub Date: 03/22/2010
Publication: Name: The Behavior Analyst Today Publisher: Behavior Analyst Online Audience: Academic Format: Magazine/Journal Subject: Psychology and mental health Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2010 Behavior Analyst Online ISSN: 1539-4352
Issue: Date: Spring, 2010 Source Volume: 11 Source Issue: 2
Topic: Event Code: 310 Science & research Canadian Subject Form: Human behaviour
Product: Product Code: 9911220 Behavior Theory
Geographic: Geographic Scope: United States Geographic Code: 1USA United States
Accession Number: 244271251
Full Text: Introduction

As a behavior analyst working in the area of occupational health and safety part of my job is to persuade people to implement behavioral interventions. When speaking to safety professionals I try to follow the heuristic that my language should only be as technical as the audience requires. In general, the audience does not need to know about establishing operations, discriminative stimuli for punishment, unsignaled avoidance behavior, or analogs to reinforcement. These are things that I should know about in order to design effective interventions. The audience needs something much different: they need to learn in a memorable way that behavior is powerfully affected by its consequences, and to be persuaded that sustained behavioral management processes are necessary to prevent disease and injury. The purpose of the current paper is to share a practical way of talking with people about the common behavioral underpinnings of health and safety problems. Instead of teaching technical operant relations and principles, I describe four Motivational Traps for bad habits (Sneaky, Rare Events, Pay-Off, and Effort Traps). My goal is to use memorable language and examples to convince audience members that their organizational safety and health problems can be solved with behavioral management techniques.

The Case for Using Plain English with Clients

When speaking with potential clients our goal should be to communicate in ways that positively affect their consumption of behavioral technology. There are several good reasons why speaking to people in plain English is better than using technical jargon. The following paragraphs review logical, traditional, and empirical reasons to use language like the Motivational Traps taxonomy in the current paper.

Logical Rationale. Imagine a simplified bridge building scenario that includes a bridge engineer/designer, construction workers, and end users. The engineer/designer must understand physics and mathematics in order to design a safe structure; the construction workers need the skills to follow plans and build a structure that meets technical specifications, but do not need to know how to describe the physics behind the design; the end users don't need to know the science or engineering behind the bridge design or any technical specifications for components, but instead, just need access to an appealing and functioning structure that gets them from point A to point B. The end user is most likely to be concerned with what the bridge will look like and how it will affect traffic, not with the stress-strain curves for specific construction materials or the size and thickness of strip footings. The citizen wants a "socially acceptable" bridge.

Behavior analysts are like the engineers/designers in the analogy. We need to understand why and how a certain procedure will work, and we use a technical language to communicate with each other about the behavioral principles and functional relations that make our interventions effective. However, unlike the bridge engineer/designer, behavior analysts sometimes require that practitioners who implement our interventions (construction workers in the analogy) speak and write like behavioral engineers, when all a technician needs to know is how to skillfully implement a prescribed intervention process. And, even further removed from the logic of a construction project, behavior analysts sometimes expect their clients (end users) to learn and understand technical terms for operant functional relations, when all the user wants is to get from point A to point B in the most comfortable and convenient way possible. Our clients want a socially acceptable technique for changing behavior, not a behavioral science education. Admittedly, behavioral technology is much harder for an end user to "consume" than a bridge, but end users don't need to speak like a behavior analyst to train their dog, shape their child's behavior, or get their workers to wear personal protective equipment. They just need to know what they must do to generate the behavior they want. The point of the bridge analogy above is that we need to speak in ways that make our techniques easy and appealing to use. In Jon Bailey's (1991) words, ".. .the problem with behavior analysis is not that we are too technological but rather that we have not realized that we are ultimately in the business of developing a 'consumable' product that must be 'user friendly'..." (p. 445)

Traditional Rationale. The impact of technical language on the lay public has been a concern since the formative years of applied behavior analysis, and notable behavior analysts have developed useful ways of communicating with the public. When Lindsley and colleagues established the first human operant research laboratory at the Metropolitan State Hospital in Waltham, Massachussetts, they named their operation "Studies in Behavior Therapy" (Lindsley, 1991). Lindsley explained that they were concerned about negative reactions to more technical names for the laboratory (e.g., Experimental Analysis of Behavior Laboratory), so they used a simple empirical method to select an appropriate "plain English" alternative. Their method involved having patients, parents, and physicians rank order potential names according to their descriptive value and potential offensiveness, and then the researchers selected the lab name on the basis of those social validity data. The use of plain English with clients became an important subsequent theme in Lindsley's work, and between the years of 1953 and 1991, he and his colleagues used a 10-step empirical method to generate plain English translations for about 40 jargon terms (Lindsley, 1991). Examples of translations included using "before" instead of "baseline," "pinpoint" instead of "target behavior," and "relief instead of "negative reinforcement." Lindsley gathered data on the effectiveness of using plain English translations with clients during some of his workshops. For example, when comparing two jargon words to their translations, only about 20% of workshop groups correctly matched the jargon words to their Skinnerian meanings, while 90% correctly matched the translations to their appropriate meanings (Lindsley, 1991).

While technical jargon may have the same precise effects on behavior analysts, consumers of behavioral technology can easily misunderstand or react badly to our technical language. In Lindsley's (1991) words, "... you should select words for their effects on the listener, not for their effects on the speaker (Skinner, 1957)" (p. 449). For example, to a behavior analyst the word "rate" means the frequency of behavior over time. However, for a member of the lay public the word "rate" has many other popular meanings, including a fixed price, a subjective evaluation of value, or interest percentages. Other terms we use such as manipulate, control, and intervene may cause people to withdraw from rather than approach our technology (Bailey, 1991). While Lindsley's systematic and empirical approach to selecting words to use with clients is unparalleled, other behavior analysts have argued for the importance of tailoring our language for public audiences (e.g., Bailey, 1991) and have developed acronyms and terms that make behavioral technology easier for users to "consume" (Daniels, 1989; Gilbert, 1978; Haughton, 1981). A good example is Daniel's (1989) PICNIC system for evaluating the power of behavioral consequences by rating them as Positive or Negative, Immediate or Future, and Certain or Uncertain, with the most powerful consequences being PICs or NICs.

Empirical Rationale. The way we talk with clients is more of a professional tradition than it is an empirical field of study. However, communication and information processing research suggests that we should use simple language and pictures when marketing behavioral technology to the public. In the area of occupational safety, Larkin (2007) found that the average reading level of safety communications in several oil and chemical companies was the 16th grade. Based on literacy levels in the US, he estimated that only 4% of supervisors and workers would read, understand, and have their behavior affected by the average safety bulletin. In other words, the bulletins were being written in the language of the speakers (highly educated safety professionals) and not in the language of the listeners (supervisors and line workers). Larkin reviewed data showing that if the text was reduced to the 5th grade level then about 70% of readers would understand the material (Aldridge, 2004; Brownson, 1990), and that including pictures could improve understanding above written text alone by over 100% (Mayer, Bove, Bryman, Mars, & Tapango, 1996).

Research on the cognitive concept of "information overload" supports the general strategy of using pictures and small amounts of plain English text when communicating about technical topics. In this area of study, information overload is said to occur when the quantity and/or difficulty of information presented to a user exceeds the information processing capacity of that user (O'Reilly, 1980). It has been hypothesized that a user experiencing overload must shift thinking resources from understanding the information to selecting which parts of the information to attend to, which results in less total information "processed" and poorer performance (Iastrebova, 2006). Although the effects of information overload on hypothesized private events are difficult to study, the behavioral effects include decreased information usage and recall, and poorer performance on subsequent tasks related to the information. For example, Mayer et al. (1996) conducted a series of experiments where they measured the effects of different types of information on recall and generalized problem solving. The information focused on teaching the steps of lightning formation to learners with limited knowledge of meteorology. In the first two experiments the authors showed that an illustrated summary with about 50 words produced 50% better recall than a 600 word textbook style passage, and that the illustrations in the short summary were essential for producing good generalized problem solving scores. In a final experiment the authors demonstrated how overloading learners produced stepwise reductions in performance. Conditions evaluated included the original short illustrated summary, the illustrated summary plus 50 extra words, and the illustrated summary plus an 550 extra words. Adding 50 words reduced recall and problem solving by 15% and 24% respectively, and adding 550 words reduced recall and problem solving by 66% and 44% respectively.

Preface to the Taxonomy of Motivational Traps

The way I talk about Motivational Traps has grown from an early interest in behaviors that prevent delayed aversive consequences (Olson, 1997) and exposure to the work of Platt and colleagues in the area of Social and Individual Traps (Platt, 1973). The material lives in the introductory slides of my presentations, and helps me get audience members "on the hook" early in my talks. Over the years, most technical language has been "selected out," while more catchy and memorable language has survived. Many behavioral problems share a fundamental mechanistic origin, which is that at-risk behavior is supported by immediate pay-offs, while desirable prevention behaviors have only small, cumulative, or delayed benefits. Therefore, a memorable way of talking about this dilemma might be useful to behavior analysts working on a range of special problems. On this note, the categories of Motivational Traps were organized to serve a practical function, and not for the purposes of technically defining types of behavioral contingencies or principles that could be tested with experiments. However, there may be some experimental heuristic value in thinking about the high-level themes associated with behaviors that prevent disease and injury.

My general goal when speaking with safety professionals (or teachers, parents, clients) is to convince them that environmental consequences have powerful effects on behavior, and to do so in the most compelling and memorable way possible. I want them to remember my points, talk about behavior amongst themselves, and seek out more information after I am gone. In Malcom Gladwell's (2000) terms, I am trying to design a speech that is "sticky" (i.e., memorable, useful, repeatable). Within my sphere of practice, the way I have come to talk about Motivational Traps seems to have some stickiness. Audience members have responded well and remember parts of my speech after we meet. In presentations I generally cover the topic in less than five minutes, so the descriptions of Traps in the paragraphs below are not meant to be a verbatim summary of my presentation. In addition, I have written each section as if I were describing the Trap to a safety professional, but with "asides" that are meant for behavior analyst colleagues. This is a somewhat awkward writing style, but it seemed to be the most appropriate given the current topic. In addition, safety professionals have a cultural value that their top priority is to physically engineer hazards completely out of the work environment when it is possible. Therefore, when talking about Motivational Traps, I support this value by emphasizing that engineering hazards out of the environment is the best practice because it prevents Motivational Traps from taking control over behavior. And finally, most at-risk behaviors are encouraged by multiple complex contingencies, so in most cases more than one Trap applies. The point of my pitch, however, is not to describe the technicalities of complex behavior-consequence relationships, but rather, to help the audience understand that behavioral consequences matter.

Motivational Traps

Nature is in Control

My first goal is to set the stage that nature is in control. I introduce the topic of Motivational Traps by arguing that nature has stacked the odds in favor of production. The word production could be replaced with "chronic disease" or "risk-taking," or one could write that the odds are stacked against "prevention." The point is that if an organization has no active process or management system to prevent injury and illness, then nature will win, and workers will be injured at predictable rates. In my slides I have pictures of two "tug-of-war" teams, with one side having several team members and the other with just one person who is clearly outmatched and in agony (See Figure 1; See acknowledgment at end of article for source of photos). I argue that we are all built to respond best to the demands of our immediate environment. In general, people work to maximize short-term gain, while discounting the importance or significance of the delayed consequences of their actions (short-term maximizing, delay discounting) (Herrnstein, Loewnstein, Prelec, & Vaughan, 1993). While this orientation is adaptive in many situations, it does not naturally encourage behaviors that prevent disease and injury over the long-term. After emphasizing that nature is in charge I am ready to talk about four types of Motivational Traps for bad habits. The use of both words is purposeful. First, "Motivational" Traps is better than "Contingency" Traps. Contingency has multiple meanings that can be confusing, including planned or organized responses to emergency events (Poling, 2010). And, although behavior analysts might like to argue about how Motivation is a cognitive epiphenomenon resulting from current environmental contingencies, genetics, and learning history, a lay audience member will take the term at face value. A person who hears the word "Motivational" is likely to think, "OK, we're talking about how badly people want to do things." Second, the Trap concept is compelling because people can think about natural forces luring us into harmful situations. Traps are also easily illustrated with analogies for both acute events (traumatic injuries) and chronic conditions (heart disease). For example, it is easy for someone to think of a mouse trap snapping violently shut (acute), or of a slow hike down a deep canyon that goes horribly wrong and results in no easy way out (chronic).


Pay-Off Traps

Most behaviors that increase the risk of injury or chronic disease have immediate pay-offs. In other words, it is often more comfortable, convenient, or pleasurable to take risks than it is to engage in health promoting or prevention behavior. For example, Ben and Jerry's ice cream tastes great, a drag on a cigarette delivers a bolus of nicotine to the brain within seconds, and driving fast in a car can be fun and exhilarating. In the workplace the Pay-Off Trap causes trouble because people generally seek out the quickest path to reinforcement, which is evident when people skip steps or short cut safety procedures. While observing in a manufacturing plant, I once watched a worker walk across a steel ground-level conveyor belt to get to his destination instead of walking 30 feet to bypass the hazard. Getting to the destination just a few seconds sooner was enough to cause the worker to take a short cut over a significant slip hazard. The point is that people are sensitive to maximizing even minor pay-offs in the immediate environment, and that these small behavioral shortcuts can substantially magnify hazard exposure. I rarely, if ever, use the word reinforcer when talking about pay-off traps. The word pay-off is good enough and has more memorable associations, such as winning a lottery or experiencing a natural or chemical high. Moreover, I think it is an easy way for professionals to start thinking diagnostically about workplace behavioral problems. They can ask themselves, "What's the pay-off when our workers do (insert your own problem behavior)?"

Rare Events Traps

Bad things just don't happen that often, even in the most dangerous occupations. After sharing this general truism, I will usually illustrate the Rare Events Trap with statistics from an occupation with elevated injury or fatality rates. For example, almost 20% of all annual workplace fatalities are occupational drivers, however, the chances of any individual driver being killed on the job is about 28 in 100,000 each year (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). Drivers who wear safety belts are 5 times less likely to be killed in a serious crash than unbelted drivers (Sivak, Schoettle, & Rupp, 2010), but most individuals never have a serious crash where they personally experience a belt's protective benefits. Rare Events Traps are also relevant to slowly developed chronic conditions. For example, smoking is responsible for 85% of all lung cancer cases, but only 15 out of 100 smokers eventually develop lung cancer (The Society of Thoracic Surgeons, 2010). On this theme, my undergraduate mentor Carl Cheney used to ask us "what is the consequence for avoidance behavior?" Most of the students in class were, of course, afraid to answer one of Carl's loaded rhetorical questions, so he would answer himself by saying "Nothing bad happening! Is nothing a consequence? No. Can nothing shape behavior? Not very well." Later on, Carl taught us about the complexities of avoidance behavior, including unsignaled acquisition of avoidance responses (Sidman, 1953), but the lesson he pushed in his introductory classes was that prevention behaviors often have no perceptible effect on the immediate environment and no perceptible relation to the delayed aversive consequences they prevent. In other words, avoidance behaviors are generally on extinction or exceedingly lean reinforcement schedules. So, the take home point for lay audience members is that we just aren't built to respond very well to non-events. I don't have to tell them about extinction, reinforcement schedules, or anything of the sort. People understand that "nothing bad happening" or "business proceeding as usual" is not going to have powerful effects on behavior.

Effort Traps

People are built to find the path of least effort for reaching a goal. In most situations, it is good for people to conserve energy by finding the most efficient way to get things done. In pre-industrial ages this was adaptive and had survival value, but in the modern petroleum age where we have easy access to calorie dense foods and motorized transport, it is a recipe for obesity, diabetes, heart disease, sleep apnea, and so on. Exercise is the best example of an Effort Trap because by definition it burns more calories than more sedentary behavioral options such as sitting or driving. In occupational settings our susceptibility to this Principle of Least Effort is dangerous because it can discourage the use of personal protective equipment. For example, 47% of fatal falls in construction are due to failure to use or improper use of fall protection equipment that was available at the worksite at the time of the event (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2000). Why does this happen? Well, from a behavioral perspective, it is more effortful to work while wearing a fall protection harness. The worker must clip, unclip, and then re-clip the tie off as he or she moves about the work area. In this regard it is useful to think of the Effort Trap producing its effects in tandem with the Pay-Off Trap, where people engage in low effort at-risk behaviors that produce small but meaningful pay-offs.

Another example of an Effort Trap is using recommended body mechanics when lifting, which is usually described as bending at the knees, holding the object close to your trunk, and lifting with the legs. In graduate school I took a "Physiology of Work" course from Tycho Fredericks who demonstrated the Effort Trap by having us measure each other's oxygen consumption as we lifted boxes using different body mechanics techniques. The prescribed "safe" technique for repeatedly lifting a box from the floor to another level required significantly more oxygen than bending at the waist. It should therefore be no surprise that poor body mechanics are common during manual material handling; it feels and literally is easier to bend at the waist. The Effort Trap is a compelling reason to place a priority on engineering the physical environment so that the risky behavior is not possible. In other words, rather than relying on people to overcome the Effort Trap and use proper body mechanics, it is better to design an environment where people are not required to lift boxes from the floor to another level, or where they can use tools to move material without bending over. Smart engineering of the physical environment can often generate better behavior than reinforcement-oriented management processes. In fact, environmental alteration is the best kind of behavioral technology because it is almost as easy to use as a bridge. Our end users can get from point A to point B without having to manage or self-manage behavior, which as we all know, is "effortful" work!

Sneaky Traps

Many of the most devastating diseases and injuries arise gradually in tiny, imperceptible steps. If the audience seems receptive (I detect no [SD.sup.P+]), I sometimes refer to the Sneaky Trap as the "boiling frog problem." This is a politically incorrect but extremely memorable analogy I once heard that goes as follows. If you want to boil a frog, you have to put the frog in tepid water and then gradually ramp up the heat. If you throw him in boiling water, he'll jump right out. Nobody in their right mind would throw themselves into "boiling water," but many of us are sitting in that tepid water and ramping up the heat with our bad habits. For example, 1 lb of fat represents 3500 stored kilocalories. Exceeding energy requirements by 500 calories (about one large soda) on about two days each week could cause a person to gain about 1 pound of fat per month. Over a year, a person could gain about 12 lbs. Over 10 years, a person could end up 120 lbs heavier and meet the criterion for class III obesity (See Figure 2 for an example of a Sneaky Traps slide). In the occupational domain cumulative trauma injuries have a similar slow onset. For example, a professional driver with a poor quality seat could be exposed to elevated levels of harmful whole body vibrations (Bovenzi & Betta, 1994; Bovenzi & Zadini, 1992; Pope, Wilder, & Magnusson, 1998). However, back pain and detectable damage to the body might not be evident for many years down the road. Sneaky Traps are perhaps the most deadly and difficult to overcome because once you have been trapped the way out is long and hard. Sometimes it is simply impossible to reverse the aversive condition. These traps epitomize the analogy I shared in the Introduction where a person slowly hikes down a beautiful and cool canyon only to find out later that there is no easy way (or no way) to climb out.


When Leaders get Trapped

When a leader falls victim to a Motivational Trap, the effects are magnified throughout an organization. Because workers are injured or made sick more often than managers, I spend a lot of time talking about the plight of workers on the front line of production. However, the upstream decisions made by leaders have significant downstream consequences for workers. In this sense line worker behavior is the "final common pathway" (p. 19) rather than the fundamental cause, of injuries and illness (Krause, 1997). What this means is that complex factors at every level of the organization ultimately converge upon and create the environmental and social conditions experienced by workers on the ground, and that line worker behaviors are therefore only the final step in organizational causal chains. Do leaders make investments in engineering controls for physical hazards? Do leaders set a pace of production that does not harm workers' bodies? Do leaders purchase convenient and comfortable personal protective equipment and reinforce its use? Do leaders make healthy food choices available, and incorporate opportunities for exercise into the daily work routine? The answer to these questions is often "no" because leader behavior is also subject to Motivational Traps. Leaders can fail to make investments in safety equipment and machinery maintenance in order to maximize short-term profits (Pay-Off Trap). A leader may cancel an expensive training program on handling hazardous chemicals because there has never been a chemical injury at a plant (Rare Events Trap). A leader might sit in his or her office instead of spending time interacting with workers, monitoring performance, and reinforcing healthful and safe practices (Effort Trap). A leader might tolerate a hazardous condition, such as elevated exposure to whole body vibration among workers, because the negative consequences are only experienced gradually over decades (Sneaky Trap). The point is that leaders, who often attend our talks as behavior analysts, should consider how their own behavior is affected by Traps.

Discussion and Conclusion

Future Directions

As noted above, the way we talk with potential clients about behavioral technology is a professional tradition more than it is an empirical area of study. As described above in the Introduction, I developed the taxonomy of Motivational Traps unsystematically through trial and error, and have only anecdotal evidence that it is effective for helping clients understand and get interested in behavioral management techniques. However, we would probably become much better at disseminating behavioral technology if we used the scientific method to understand how our professional speech affects our listeners' behavior. In this regard, we should encourage more use of Lindsley's (1991) 10-step empirical approach to selecting plain English translations of behavioral terms and tactics. In addition, technologies are available that make it possible to collect in vivo evaluation data during presentations. For example, radio frequency (RF) cards can be used with Turning Point[R] and PowerPoint[R] software to ask audience members multiple choice questions as a presentation is taking place. With RF cards the effects of a Motivational Traps talk could be easily compared to the effects of an alternative more technically oriented presentation. In addition to gathering reaction criteria, behavior analysts should be encouraged to evaluate their professional presentations and workshops with all four levels of Kirkpatrick's (1959) criteria for evaluating training effectiveness: (1) reaction, (2) learning, (3) behavior change, and (4) results. With regard to learning, how many concepts can participants list and define at the end of a talk? How many questions can they answer correctly before and after the training? What can participants recall several weeks after a presentation? With regard to behavior, direct measurement of change is difficult. However, attendees could be surveyed several weeks later about whether they applied any recommended techniques or sought out additional behavioral reading material. And finally, do our presentations produce results of value to the presenter or the attendees' organizations? Did it result in any actual implementations of behavioral interventions? Future research in this area seems essential if we want our technology to be widely recognized and applied by people around the globe (Poling, 2010).


It is useful and important for behavior analysts to package their expertise for the consumption of practitioners and end users. In the area of occupational health and safety, I've found it useful to package information about the behavioral underpinnings of diseases and injuries as Motivational Traps. The goal is to deliver a "sticky" speech that convinces audience members of the power of behavioral consequences, and hopefully causes them to seek out more information. I hope some of my colleagues will find this "practical taxonomy" useful and relevant to their own behavioral engineering practice. The take home points of my approach are:

* Nature is in Control: Nature has stacked the odds in favor of risky behavior

* Getting Trapped: Motivational Traps lure people into behaviors that generate sudden or violent aversive consequences like a mousetrap (acute injury), or that generate cumulative aversive consequences like a hike down a canyon that results in no easy way out (chronic disease).

* Pay-Off Trap: Most behaviors that increase the risk of injury or chronic disease have immediate pay-offs. Even small pay-offs can trap people in bad habits that substantially increase hazard exposure.

* Rare Events Trap: Bad things just don't happen that often, even in the most dangerous occupations. Our behavior is not affected powerfully by "non-events."

* Effort Trap: People are built to find the path of least effort for reaching their goals. It is best to engineer the environment in ways that eliminate Effort Traps altogether.

* Sneaky Trap: Many of the most devastating diseases and injuries arise gradually in tiny, imperceptible steps. Sneaky Traps are very hard, and sometimes impossible, to escape.

* Leaders are Human Too: When a leader falls victim to a Motivational Trap the effects are magnified throughout an organization. Although worker behavior is the final common pathway to illness and injury, leaders ultimately have the most power to shape the work environment and the behavior it generates.


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Photos retrieved from and reproduced with the photographer's permission.

Author Contact Information

Ryan Olson, PhD

Assistant Scientist

Center for Research on Occupational & Environmental Toxicology

Oregon Health & Science University

3181 SW Sam Jackson Park Rd, L606

Portland, OR 97239-3098

Phone: (503) 494-2501

Fax: (503) 494-4278

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