Incidents in anaesthesia: past occurrence and future avoidance.
Anesthesia (Health aspects)
Perioperative care (Management)
Perioperative care (Safety and security measures)
Patients (Care and treatment)
Patients (Safety and security measures)
|Publication:||Name: Journal of Perioperative Practice Publisher: Association for Perioperative Practice Audience: Academic Format: Magazine/Journal Subject: Health; Health care industry Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2009 Association for Perioperative Practice ISSN: 1750-4589|
|Issue:||Date: Oct, 2009 Source Volume: 19 Source Issue: 10|
|Topic:||Event Code: 260 General services; 200 Management dynamics Computer Subject: Company business management|
This article is a revised version of an analysis of reported incidents related to anaesthesia, originally published in the journal Anaesthesia (Catchpole et al 2008a) and undertaken on behalf of the National Patient Safety Agency. The purpose was to examine the range, types, frequencies and causes of reported patient safety incidents associated with anaesthesia. First we examined anaesthetic incidents as a sub-set of the total number of reported incidents; then we examined pre-surgery assessment, epidural anaesthesia, and anaesthetic awareness incidents, as they were identified as being frequent and of potential concern. To our knowledge it was the first paper to analyse and present results of the NPSA's database in a clinical academic journal. Here, we take the opportunity to re-present and review the findings in light of subsequent progress in understanding and improving patient safety and quality of care.
This study considered all patient safety incidents reported to the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS) from January 2004 to February 2006. At the time of the study there were approximately 550,000 incident reports in the database. In order to examine events related to anaesthesia, pre-surgery assessment, epidurals, and awareness events, keyword searches were conducted to focus on reported incidents that were associated with each of these areas of interest (Table 1). Keywords were identified based on the understanding of how each problem might manifest itself in a reported event. We further analysed two sub-groups of pre-surgery assessment incidents: unexpected events in surgery and allergy or allergic reactions in surgery, as they are most likely to originate from problems in the assessment process. Existing type, cause and severity classifications were used, even though this was of variable quality and consistency. Incidents were removed that were featured more than once or were considered inappropriate following inspection.
A total of 12,649 incidents (approximately 2% of all reported incidents) related to anaesthesia. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of severity and type. Most incidents did not lead to any harm, with only 2% leading to severe harm or death. Of largest cause were treatment and procedure problems, and infrastructure or equipment problems, with clinical assessment being the least likely cause. Using NRLS data to estimate the likely effect given a cause (Table 2), a number of patterns emerge regarding cause and severity. Documentation/consent issues and infrastructure/equipment issues appear to carry a lower risk: they more frequently result in no harm, than process, treatment, or clinical assessment incidents.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Examining specific types of incident, 831 reports were found to be related to the pre-surgery assessment process. A further 43 unexpected events in surgery and 161 allergy or allergic reactions in surgery were also found. Levels of harm for each are shown in figure 2, with unexpected events clearly the least frequent, but the most likely to cause injury if they occur.
Treatment/procedure failures are frequent for all three incident types (Figure 3), as are documentation and communication failures. 516 incidents were found to be associated with epidural anaesthesia, which appears to carry a higher degree of harm, with causes attributed more to treatment/procedure and medication than in the general sample (Figure 4). Finally, 18 cases of awareness events were identified (some with pain, and some without), a further seven showed feeling of the operation under regional anaesthetic, 19 suggested inadequate analgesia during surgery, and 10 incidents describe near-miss situations, where pain or awareness were only narrowly avoided. One case describes awareness of a procedure even though no procedure was performed. 42 incidents were associated with failures in the treatment or procedure (Figure 5), with seven equipment failures, four process failures and three medication failures.
The NRLS was easily searchable using simple database and spreadsheet tools, and the data set allowed a structured approach to understanding the wide range of systemic problems faced by practitioners in ensuring the safety of their patients. As expected, most adverse events reflected a failure of multiple components within the system, rather than suggesting errors by insufficiently qualified or negligent individuals. The generally low rate of harm in this data reinforces the view that healthcare practitioners play the key role in preventing systemic weaknesses from harming the patient, and that there is a growing culture of safety reporting. However, methods of analysis and quality assurance in voluntary systems mean that the data must be used with caution. There is a bias in who reports, what is reported, and the level of harm that is reported (Kreckler et al 2009). Serious incidents usually suggest a sequence of events, and it can be difficult to examine multiple causes, or chains of causation, thus hiding the true diversity of causes of these incidents.
Nothwithstanding such classification or hindsight bias (Woods & Cook 1999, Tamuz et al 2002) failures in treatment and procedure appear to be the most frequent and are among the highest levels of harm. Process failures also appear to be both frequent, and potentially harmful. Medication failures can be harmful and are moderately frequent, but rarely result in severe harm or death. Less harmful, though not always infrequent are consent and documentation failures, with equipment and infrastructure failures both relatively infrequent, and rarely associated with harm. This is supported by other studies (Fasting & Gisvold 2002, Goldhill & Waldmann 2006) and has been replicated in a similar assessment of the NHS-Litigation Authority (Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts) incident database (Catchpole et al 2006).
The key challenge in improving safety is to help practitioners bring about institutional change. Suggestions for future improvement are found in Table 3. Aspects under the control of the individual anaesthetist such as new techniques, equipment or improving technical skills might be of benefit, but bring new classes of problem and need to be considered with care (Cook & Woods 1996. Steffek et al 2004). The role of the practitioner as the last line of defence suggests that there may be a particular benefit in improving understanding of why errors occur, the recognition of potentially harmful situations, and the anticipation of such events in advance. Such 'non-technical' skills are rarely trained outside crisis management, even though they have been recognised as being important in anaesthesia for some time (Schaefer et al 1995, Fletcher et al 2000, 2003).
Since the completion and original publication of this study, there has been substantial progress in addressing front-line safety issues. The NRLS itself now contains well over 2 million incidents. In part as a consequence of these studies, the Royal College of Anaesthetists has now taken ownership of the reporting process, to allow better analysis, feedback, and empowerment by the specialty. This will also lead to better rates of reporting, improved use of incident reports and more focused assessments of specific safety issues.
Two complementary models of causation have been proposed both of which emphasise the critical role of the situation in which clinicians find themselves. The first model, popularly known as the 'Swiss Cheese' model (Reason 1990, 1997) emphasises the importance of providing a supporting system that recognizes and reduces the many chances of causing injury, rather than relying wholly on individuals to avoid or rescue. The second model is the escalation or 'Snowball' model (Helmreich 2000, Helmreich & Musson 2000, Catchpole et al 2005, 2007, 2008b), which describes how serious harm can arise from the accumulation of small, otherwise innocuous and unconnected sequences of events. The more problems there are, the greater the erosion of spare human capacity, and the more difficult it becomes to analyse and control the situation. Performance is degraded, thus increasing the chances of further harmful errors. The 'Snowball' model provides a model of accelerating risk, where the chances of patient injury can increase or decrease with moment-to-moment changes. Together, these models help us to understand more accurately why errors happen in the operating theatre (Catchpole et al 2008c, Healey et al 2008).
There is also increased awareness of the importance of safety management (Healthcare Commission 2009) and in the uptake of safety practices by clinicians, and the evidence of their efficacy (Haynes et al 2009). The use of safety cultural surveys is increasing, and the success of care bundles (Resar et al 2005), checklists (Haynes et al 2009), human factors non-technical safety training (Moorthy et al 2006, Haller et al 2008, McCulloch et al 2009), and new models of service safety and quality improvement (Young & McClean 2008) are informing and changing approaches to safety. We are also learning the value of feedback, empowerment of front-line staff, and the need to integrate prospective process and retrospective outcome data to understand and address systemic weaknesses.
There is no universal panacea for improving safety in anaesthesia. Incident reporting systems are one method with which to learn, anticipate and avoid future problems, and the true value of these systems is only just beginning to be realised. However, what is most clear is the importance of front-line staff in responding to new and unanticipated problems, identifying areas of systemic weakness, taking ownership of the problems, and being empowered by management to address and resolve them. The application of human factors knowledge--both through the training of generic teamwork skills and through specific expertise in systems design and evaluation--will be central to these future developments.
KEYWORDS Safety / Error / Incident reporting / Teamwork / Anaesthesia
The authors would like to thank all those who have taken the time to report these incidents, and the NPSA for funding and supporting this work. In particular, we would like to thank Sara Johnson (NPSA), Dominic Bell (Leeds Teaching Hospitals and NPSA), and Mark Boult (Det Norske Veritas) for their contributions to the earlier study. Dr Catchpole is gratefully supported by a Leverhulme Trust early career fellowship.
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Leverhulme Research Fellow, Quality, Reliability,
Safety and Teamwork Unit (QRSTU), Nuffield
Department of Surgery, University of Oxford
Reader in Surgery, Head of the Quality, Reliability, Safety and Teamwork Unit (QRSTU), Nuffield Department of Surgery, University of Oxford
Correspondence address: Ken Catchpole, Level 6, The John Radcliffe, Headington, Oxford, OX3 9DU. Email: email@example.com
Table 1: Incidents identified for analysis Topic Keyword Search Hits Comment All Anaest * OR 12649 All incidents reported anest * considered anaesthetic incidents Anaes * AND 1155 828 incidents selected assess * for further analysis Pre-surgery Anaes * AND 110 43 incidents selected assessment unexpected for further analysis Anaes * AND 187 161 relevant incidents Allergy Epidural Epidural 2009 516 selected for further analysis incidents Epidural AND 30 27 selected far headache further analysis Epidural AND 16 8 selected for further puncture analysis Epidural AND 1 Suitable for analysis back ache Epidural AND 2 1 suitable; 1 added abscess from analysis elsewhere Anaesthetic 59 Pressure sores not AND sore 40 considered any Epidural further. AND sore Awareness Anaes * AND 59 No relevant cases during aware * 18 relevant anaesthesia incidents; 40 Anaes * AND 609 other incidents pain of interest Anaes * AND 2 No relevant awake incidents Anaes * AND None NBA psycho * Anaes * AND None PTSD Anaes * AND 12 4 partially traumatic relevant incidents Table 2: Probability of outcome given incident cause Total No Low or Severe Number Harm Moderate or Death Process 1067 69% 28% 4% Clinical assessment 524 76% 21% 3% Documentation/Consent 2273 87% 13% 1% Medication 1120 79% 20% 1% Infrastructure/ Equipment 2791 83% 15% 1% Treatment/ Procedure 3856 67% 30% 3% Other 1018 64% 33% 4% Table 3: Areas to investigate for improvement Incident Type Potential improvement Pre-Surgery Better defined range of information (Kluger & Bullock 2002) Assessment Better elicitation of information Incidents Maintain flexibility for patient needs Standardised & comprehensive documentation * Improved design of consent form Methods for accurate & timely communication * Standardised handovers (Horn et al 2004) * Pre-operative briefings (Hofer & Hayward 2002) Better defined competencies for conducting assessment (Rai & Pandit 2003, Ormrod & Casey 2004) Epidural Minimise risk of infection Incidents (Phillips et al 2002) * Use of care bundles (REF) Consider use of ultrasound (REF) Standardise practices (Trim et al 2003) Consider use of test dose (Steffek et al 2004) Consider use of small-gauge needles (Candido & Stevens 2003) Ensure optimal patient positioning (de Filho et al 2002) Better understanding of expertise/experience (de Filho et al 2002) Better understanding of organisational factors (Mayberry & Clemmens 2002) Offer of blood patch to high-risk patients (Candido & Stevens 2003) Awareness Recognise and respond early Incidents (Lennmarken et al 2002) * Psychiatric assessment * Treatment * Long-term follow up Consider equipment techniques for identification (Sigalovsky 2003) Maintain vigilance &reduce distraction (Weinger & Englund 1990) Non-technical skills training (Fletcher et al 2002) Better classification of awareness incidents Better grading for severity Timely root cause analysis Figure 1: Severity and type of all anaesthetic incidents Severe, 181, 1% Death, 88, 1% No Harm, 9531, 75% Low, 1977, 16% Moderate, 872, 7% Process, 1067, 8% Clinical assessment, 524, 4% Documentation/Consent, 2273, 18% Medication, 1120, 9% Infrastructure/Equipment, 2791, 22% Treatment/Procedure, 3856, 31% Other, 1018, 8% Note: Table made from pie chart. Figure 3: Causes of assessment failures Allergy incidents Other 2% Process 4% Assessment 1% Documentation/Communication 49% Medication 19% Infrastructure/Equipment 0% Treatment/Procedure 25% Unexpected incidents Process 5% Assessment 2% Documentation/Communication 5% Infrastructure Equipment 0% Medication 0% Treatment/Procedure 62% Other 26% All Assessment incidents Other 2% Process 8% Assessment 54% Documentation/Communication 12% Medication 2% Infrastructure/Equipment 4% Treatment/Procedure 18% Note: Table made from pie chart. Figure 4: Severity and causes of epidural incidents Death, 2, 0% No Harm, 340, 66% Low, 94, 18% Moderate, 71, 14% Severe, 9, 2% Process, 50, 10% Clinical Assessment, 11, 2% Documentation/Consent, 53, 10% Medication 83, 16% Infrastructure/Equipment, 83, 16% Treatment/Procedure, 202, 39% Other, 34, 7% Note: Table made from pie chart. Figure 5: Causes of awareness during anaesthesia Other, 0, 0% Process, 4, 7% Assessment, 1, 2% Documentation/Communication, 1, 2% Medication, 3, 5% Infrastructure/Equipment. 7, 12% Treatment/Procedure, 42, 72% Note: Table made from pie chart.
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