Drug smuggling behavior: a developmental smuggling model: Part 1.
Drug traffic (Research)
|Author:||Lichtenwald, Terrance G.|
|Publication:||Name: The Forensic Examiner Publisher: American College of Forensic Examiners Audience: Professional Format: Magazine/Journal Subject: Health; Law; Science and technology Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2003 American College of Forensic Examiners ISSN: 1084-5569|
|Issue:||Date: Nov-Dec, 2003 Source Volume: 12 Source Issue: 11-12|
|Topic:||Event Code: 310 Science & research|
|Geographic:||Geographic Scope: United States Geographic Code: 1USA United States|
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behavioral characteristics, developmental smugling model (DSM), United States Customs Service (U.S. Customs Service), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), smuggling, drug profile, drug smuggling
A Note About This Article
This article has beam divided into two parts. Part one, published here, introduces the article and describes a drug smuggler's perception of the current drug courier models. Next, it introduces a new developmental smuggling model (DSM) based on extensive research. Part one concludes with a description of the behavioral characteristics of the Phase-I (lowest-level) smuggler.
Part two of this article, to be published in the Spring 2004 Forensic Examiner, will describe the behavioral characteristics of the higher-level Phase-II and III smugglers, and will offer predictions based on the developmental smuggling behavior model.
This author would like to acknowledge the following individuals and agencies for providing information and/or reviewing earlier drafts of this paper: Agent Larry Himter, U.S. Customs Service, Ret.; Randy Wilt, J.D.; Frank Perri, J.D., MBA; Steven Erickson, Ph.D., psychologist; Christopher VanVleer, M.S., ED; Richard Early; Rudy Cole; U.S. Customs Service (USCS); the DEA and the FBI.
This article presents a three-phase developmental model for identification of smugglers and smuggling organizations. Information provided by an international smuggler is applied after cross-referencing with declassified government documents, sources open to the public, and published literature. The smuggling model is reviewed and critiqued by agents from various government bureaus and services and criminal defense attorneys that are knowledgeable in this area. The developmental smuggling model (DSM) is then tested on two detainees that have been arrested for participating in smuggling operations.
A unique situation emerged during my completion of a fitness to stand trial evaluation for the 17th Judicial Circuit Court, in Winnebago Country, IL. The individual being examined claimed that he was an international smuggler. Given the need to verify the assertions for the court and my interest in deriving behavioral data regarding the variances in smugglers, I carried out numerous in-depth interviews and conducted extensive psychological testing on the individual, in addition to cross-checking all given information against government records and databases from agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the U.S. Customs Service, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
The result is a unique consortium of behavioral data that was assembled over a seven-year period and used to develop a three-phase model of smuggling behavior in individuals and organizations, referred to as the Developmental Smuggling Model (DSM). The data includes behavioral characteristics for all three phases of smuggling, as well as easily identifiable traits that will aid examiners and prosecutors in predicting behavioral outcomes. The efficacy of the DSM offers tangible characteristics thought to be common among smugglers in each phase of smuggling, including education, finances, loyalties, mannerisms, diversion tactics, and socialization factors, among others. The development of quantifiable behavioral characteristics, which this model includes, is critical for correct identification of major smuggling corporations and the individuals that manage them. Assimilated information that is properly organized via the DSM is beneficial for the appropriate prosecution and sentencing of various types of smugglers, as well as the identification of currently unknown sources of smuggling.
There have been a number of studies addressing the applicability of drug profiles in the American legal system. The papers presented by Young (1991) and Bernstein (1990) challenge the validity and reliability of a drug profile as a valuable tool in the identification of individuals involved in drug smuggling. The work of Nellis (1984) challenged psychologists to assist law enforcement in identifying smugglers. Nellis directed psychologists to study the behavior of dealers and 'mules' and to develop profiles that would withstand the constitutional challenges asserted by accused persons. Nellis defined mules as people that transport drugs. Nellis suggested that his directives could be done by completing studies that link currently used profiles with additional characteristics found to be common among drug smugglers. Turco (1990) identified four factors to be considered in the preparation of psychological profiles: (1) the crime scene in its entirety; (2) knowledge of neurological behavior and dyscontrol syndrome; (3) a psychodynamic perspective; and (4) demographic material based on the population studies of perpetrators.
The development of a smuggling 'profile' is complex in comparison to the development of profiles used for the detection of perpetrators of other crimes. Complexity in the development of a classification system for profiling smugglers occurs because of the variability of smuggling behaviors and organizations. The variability ranges from acts done by individuals, small groups, and large groups; acts done in different countries; acts committed under vastly different political systems; and the extensive range of ethnicities of smugglers. Furthermore, the smuggling may involve a single individual purchasing contraband through his or her own resources, transporting it him or herself; and then either keeping it for personal use or selling it to friends. Alternately, the smuggling operation may be at the multi-national level with many financial backers, involving complex methods, intricate transportation routes, and multiple vendors. Therefore, the development of the smuggling model is distinguished from profiles of other criminal perpetrators (Singh, 1994; Douglas, Burgess, Burgess, Ressler, 1992) in that it must encompass the behaviors of solo smugglers, as well as smuggling corporations in which many individuals cooperate to commit a single crime.
The approach taken in this case study is to have an international smuggler critique the profile used to identify smugglers. Then, when possible, to cross-check the authenticity of the concepts presented in the smuggler's critique by bringing to bear governmental documents developed on this smuggler's activities, and cross-reference concepts presented by the smuggler with known forensic literature. Additionally, salient aspects of the smuggler's life history are presented. In the course of this case study an international smuggler provides a view into the criminal structure of smugglers, techniques employed in smuggling, and the behavioral characteristics of the different types of smugglers and smuggling organizations. The smuggler that serves as the subject of this case study transported a variety of contraband (i.e. drugs, people, military supplies) across borders and into a variety of countries, and interacted with a variety of smuggling organizations. The smuggler in this study also interacted with a variety of U.S. government agencies.
The smuggler presented in this study agreed to submit to psychological testing. As is normally done in a forensic psychological evaluation, the subject agreed to my cross-check of his statements by allowing me to review police and intelligence reports. The U.S. government, under the Freedom of Information Act, released police and intelligence reports related to the smuggler's behavior. Of the known documents requested, 28 were declassified and released to me and 32 were withheld (U.S. Department of Justice Drug Enforcement Administration request #96-0916-P). Finally, the information provided by the smuggler was reviewed by agents of different government services for reliability and validity.
This article is based on a forensic case study, and is presented as a theoretical paper that assesses the gathered information, both from interviews and through cross-checking the records of one smuggler. The theoretical model developed through the interviews and other data was then applied in two additional forensic cases involving smuggling. This article is not based on a controlled experiment. I utilized the availability of typically concealed information from an international smuggler. The smuggler began his initiation into smuggling by carrying drugs during smuggling runs, went on to train as a pilot for the sole purpose of acting as a smuggler, and eventually was apprehended while engaged in smuggling as his major livelihood. Following his arrest and debriefing, the subject worked as a 'confidential informant' for the U.S. government. The U.S. government positioned him in a smuggling operation where he used the placement as an opportunity to perfect his talents under the guidance of a master smuggler. The smuggling operation in which he was placed became aware of his role as a confidential informant for the U.S. government, and with his assistance, the smuggling operation attempted a campaign of feeding false information regarding smuggling operations back to the U.S. government. Within two years, the smuggling operation in which the smuggler was positioned fell apart due to law enforcement pressure and internal control issues.
At the time of this evaluation, the subject reported he had participated in a scenario in which he used his reputation as a smuggler to vouch for another individual involved in criminal activity. As payment for vouching for the other individual, the subject received transportation, food, and board. In addition, he was given contraband that he could bring back into the United States for his personal use. The subject was caught with the contraband once he was back inside the United States, and felt he had been betrayed by the agency that gave him the contraband as payment. The individual's chief complaint was that because law enforcement, intelligence, and criminal connections had been "burned out" through various betrayals, he was without a support system in his pending legal trial. I did not believe the subject's assertions, considering them either a form of mental illness or a manipulation of the examiner, court system, or both. The subject was required to identify the individuals, activities, dates, locations, reasons, and methods involved with each of his assertions.
The verification process began with the subject of this case study providing me with a list of names of all U.S. government agents, case managers, and smugglers he interfaced with during the previous decades. He was required to provide the height, weight, and race, along with distinguishing characteristics such as scars, tattoos, regional accents, habits, repetitive sayings and names used by each agent, case manager, and smuggler. The subject was compelled to diagram each office on each floor in each building with the location of each building in every city and country in which he had met U.S. government employees and other smugglers. I then called the telephone numbers provided by the subject and spoke with each government employee. Next I gathered all the information from the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) printout and his telephone contacts and began a series of behavioral interviews with the subject. Finally, I interviewed the government employees and attorneys willing to provide information as a cross-check of the subject's information.
The subject was motivated to participate in this case study by anger, fear, and a need for attention. The subject was angry because he was betrayed, and he was afraid of modifications in his detainment. His personality traits caused his need for attention. The subject's emotional motivations, his willingness to complete psychological instruments and procedures, the accessibility of govern men t records, and my availability resulted in the opportunity to collect the information presented in this case study. The subject did not receive any consideration in the dispensation of his criminal charge for assisting me. During the course of this study, information gathered from the subject was shared with U.S. government agents as a means to compare and contrast the subject's statements against the government version of events. After the initial contacts, through the telephone numbers provided by the subject, only one government agency, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), declined to provide additional research data. The CIA advised me that they could not indicate if they had any involvement and that they had no records to provide. The uniqueness of this opportunity was increased because most high-level international smugglers are either never apprehended or are killed before they are captured. This subject was alive and motivated to complete the case study process in a valid manner.
The data collected in the course of this case study was also used to construct a more inclusive classification system of smugglers. The classification system is referred to as the Developmental Smuggling Model (DSM). The DSM is offered as a hypothesis in this theoretical article so the first step can be taken in the process of empirical validation, correction, or rejection.
Unlike the work of Reuter and Haaga (1989), the smuggler in this study was required to divulge specifics about smuggling operations. I cross-checked the submitted details against information available in government documents. Organization of the smuggling market has been investigated previously (Reuter & Haaga, 1989). Reuter and Haaga state in their research that they were denied access to the high security areas (Level 3 and above). I had access to Level 3 and above. The sources and information available at Level 3 and above in the federal maximum security penitentiary significantly expanded my awareness of both national and international smuggling. For example, during my training I met a variety of high-level international smugglers as well as low-level smugglers. These meetings clarified that career smugglers housed in Level 3 and above are clearly unlike the disorganized, nonviolent novices that were made available for Reuter and Haaga (1989) to study. In contrast to the group studied by Reuter and Haaga, the men detained at the highest level in the Bureau of Prisons are ruthless, cunning, and participated in a cooperative business venture--smuggling. The men housed at the higher level removed obstacles that impeded the success of their business ventures through bribes, intimidation, extortion, and murder.
I found the papers written by Young (1991) and Bernstein (1990) to be accurate and helpful. The literature only yielded articles that profile drug smugglers who carry drugs across borders (drug couriers). I contend that the drug courier model is coo restrictive to identify the full range of smuggling behavior and organizations. Reuter and Haaga (1989) are accurate in their findings that in recent years an increasing percentage of all DEA arrestees are in Class 1 (the highest category of drug dealers). I believe the heterogeneity of the smuggler group negates appropriate classification using only one category. The one category classification system results in a situation in which individuals that have never smuggled drugs into or out of the United States bur who sell drugs at the retail level are placed in the same category as individuals that have engaged in major smuggling with minimal or no dealing.
Another difficulty with the one classification system is that application of the drug courier model focuses law enforcement's resources narrowly on finding, arresting, and convicting individuals that are in possession of illicit drugs. The focus on couriers and a single classification for all smugglers draws resources and attention away from finding, arresting, and convicting individuals that are significantly more influential in smuggling enterprises. These more influential criminals have increased the complexity of the business structure of the drug smuggling enterprise and have propelled the smuggling business into notoriety, while never actually functioning as couriers or working at the laboratory sites that create, process, or warehouse the drugs. Such individuals are likely to own the site where time drugs are processed and also have some type of business operation in place that serves as a suspiciously complicated, albeit 'legitimate' cover for the international transportation of contraband, i.e., drugs hidden in the goods being transported. Such individuals are likely to have businesses in a number of countries on several continents in an attempt to foster a shield around the illicit business transactions, while lending legitimacy to the true goal of the business venture of drug smuggling. Drug profiles available at this time, as well as the one classification system, encourage a perception bias that allows these individuals to operate without the consistency and fuller level of scrutiny they deserve.
A Drug Smuggler's Perception of Drug Courier Models
The smuggler evaluated in this study revealed that most Phase-III smugglers believe that the drug courier model of contraband transportation is done predominately by similar Phase-III smugglers. The Phase-III smugglers manipulate lower-level "pawns" or mules to achieve several goals. On occasion, the successful movement of a small amount of contraband transported by a mule is a lesser achievement.
Phase-III smuggling organizations achieve significant advantages by offering Phase-I and Phase II smugglers the opportunity to bring small amounts of drugs or other contraband into the target country rather than transporting the contraband via more secure Phase-III methods. Based on information shared by the subject of this study, Phase-III smugglers are aware that the lower-level mules are the type of smugglers that match the profile used by most law enforcement agencies. This particular smuggler's awareness of the existence of a profile is consistent with the findings of Cave and Reuter (1988). Cave and Reuter revealed that smugglers are sensitive to the DEA's observations of mules. The behavioral data derived in this theoretical paper suggests that the Phase-III smuggling organizations are able to capitalize on their sensitivities to DEA observations and manipulate law enforcement.
New information gathered during the assessment of the Phase-III individual presented in this paper is that Phase-III drug smuggling corporations (See Table 1) purposely use government law agencies' spotlight on the profile of the pawn as a means of engaging in "counterintelligence." That is, Phase-III organizations use the arrests of Phase-I and Phase-II individuals to test the interdiction system, i.e., methods, procedures, equipment capabilities, size of work force, response time, etc. Data gathered by testing the interdiction system is then used by Phase-III organizations to refine their own policies and procedures for circumventing law enforcement interventions.
This assertion made by the smuggler in this study was cross-checked with a government supervisor who had prior service with the U.S. Customs Service. The government supervisor suggested that such sensitivities to law enforcement observations are correct. A specific example is that employees of Phase-II smuggling organizations watch ports of entry into the United States. The ports-of-entry watchers employed by the smuggling corporation are referred to as spotters. The job of the spotter is to observe the U.S. government inspectors' individual behavior (i.e., whether they are tired and not as willing to check individuals or vehicles), and the means and methods for smuggling interdiction (i.e., number of vehicles not stopped for inspection).
What follows is a complex set of behaviors involving deception and counter-deception as the manager of the smuggling operation employs his mules to run the entry port, and the supervisor of the entry port uses his inspectors to interdict the smugglers. The complexity of the smuggling operation may include giving mules tranquilizers such as Valium so they can bypass the behavioral stress analysis techniques used by the inspectors. Conversely, the smuggler may sacrifice a mule to draw the attention of the inspectors who must converge on the mule for the arrest and processing. Through the sacrifice of the mule, attention is momentarily drawn to the arrest, thus distracting the inspectors.
The smuggler interviewed in this case report also revealed that Phase-III organizations purposely use apprehension of Phased and Phase-II individuals as a drain on the limited resources available to law enforcement agencies. By providing a constant challenge of mules and flooding the interdiction network with mules, the Phase-III organizations minimize the resources available for agencies to invest in the apprehension of Phase-III operations.
The smuggler assessed in this study also reported that Phase-III corporations purposely reinforce the drug courier profile, i.e., Phase-I and Phase-II, so that law agencies will be disinclined to see Phase-III smugglers while engaged in profitable transactions. According to this source, to influence the enforcement agencies' perception bias, the Phase-III smugglers actively recruit naive individuals that match law enforcement's drug courier profile. The Phase-III corporation then floods a particular territory with these mules as a means of conditioning the enforcement agencies to view drug couriers as the most rewarding target and to condition the agency to see its jurisdiction as a particularly 'target-rich environment.' In this gambit, Phase I corporations provide the enforcement agencies with high arrest rates. The high arrest rates and easy convictions serve as frequent positive reinforcement of moderate value to enforcement agencies, and thereby encourage the agencies to maintain a perception bias focused on mules. The token mules dispensed by the Phase-III organizations are of minimal value to the Phase-III organization.
The smuggler studied for this paper offered an example of such techniques. The smuggler advised that mules were recruited for a border run. The recruits were told by the smugglers to place a Bible on the dash of the vehicle they were driving. The smugglers knew that the port inspectors were aware that several individuals with Bibles on the dash of their vehicles were caught with contraband. Thus, the Bible served as a clue to an inspector to stop and search each person or vehicle. Once the inspector responded to the Bible, a lane would be open for the smuggler to send another shipment through the port of entry. A former U.S. Customs supervisor confirmed the role of Bibles on vehicle dashboards in smuggling operations.
The smuggler questioned in this study also reported that Phase-III organizations realize that variable-ratio (addictive, gambling-type) reinforcement is necessary to ensure that law enforcement agencies do not develop a more inclusive smuggler profile. Apparently, Phase-III organizations are aware that the capture of mules encourages law enforcement agencies' allegiance to the mule/smuggler profile, and that in turn, this allegiance retards the development of more inclusive models for the classification of smugglers. The Phase-III organizations are apparently concerned that development of a more inclusive model would include distinguishing characteristics of higher-level smugglers and provide a data base for evaluating the accuracy of the assumed distinguishing characteristics of the low-level smugglers.
The subject of this study indicated that it is believed among Phase-III organizations that greater risk is incurred when the drug producer and drug smuggler are of the same ethnicity or culture. That is, it is believed that when drug-producing organizations use their own high-quality mules, the mules are more likely to be caught. These are mules that the Phase-III organizations prefer to keep out of the legal system. For this reason, at the Phase-III level, economic concerns related to the successful transportation of illicit goods encourages securing the services of the professional smuggler. According to the source, a professional smuggler is an independent provider that is not of the particular ethnic classification of the Phase-III organization that hires the smuggler. At this point, the Phase-III organization may have specialized in a specific contraband, i.e., drugs, weapons, humans, exotic animals, etc. Thus, it is to the financial advantage of the Phase-III organization to secure safe passage along the smuggling routes maintained by the professional smuggler organizations.
The same source indicated that the professional smuggler, like the Phase-III organization, also gains from enforcement agencies' allegiance to the mule profile. This is because the private contractor is a highly organized individual of Phase-III caliber and the mule profile is set to apprehend low-level smugglers. The source also pointed our that in contrast, the accuracy of the mule profile has advantages to the independent contractor of Phase-III caliber in that the mule profile does eliminate competition. Competition is eliminated to the extent that novice mules, Phase-I and Phase-II individuals, are captured before honing their skills to the sharpness of the independent contractor. Thus, with fewer professional smugglers in training, there are naturally fewer professional smugglers that can offer quality services to Phase-III organizations. This phenomenon, of benefit to some smugglers by the application of the mule profile, was reported by Cave and Reuter (1988). Cave and Reuter (1988) report the profits of experienced mules may actually be higher when interdiction efforts focus on apprehension of the mules, even when adjusted to account for the increased risk to the experienced mule, as long as inexperienced smugglers alone bear the brunt of interdiction efforts.
Developmental Smuggling Model (DSM)
The individual interviewed revealed a pattern of smuggling behavior in both individuals and organizations that is not reported in the literature. The data developed during this case study is unique in that it is based on information collected during interviews that were cross-referenced for accuracy using government documents. Individuals in law enforcement and criminal defense then reviewed the hypothesis generated by the DSM theory. Finally, the behavioral predictions from the DSM were applied in two current smuggling cases. The behavioral predictions from the DSM are presented in Table I.
The DSM, when presenting either the individual smuggler or an organization of smugglers, indicates that there are predictable individual and organizational behaviors correlated with the transportation and distribution of contraband, such as illegal drugs. The benefit of the DSM theory is that in contrast to drug profile models of smuggling, the DSM allows a within-subjects (types of smugglers and/or organizations) analysis of smuggling rather than a between-groups (smugglers/organizations vs. non-smugglers/organizations) analysis.
The DSM model classifies smugglers as belonging to one of three groups. In the DSM model the first "type" of smuggler/organization is classified as Phase I, the second as Phase II, and the third as Phase III.
An individual or organization classified as belonging in Phase I is placed in this category because they have the limited goal of smuggling contraband primarily for personal or group use. This goal reflects the most developmentally primitive motivation for an individual or organization involved in smuggling. In contrast, individuals or organizations in the Phase-II level of the DSM model make a relatively more concerted effort to engage in smuggling as a profitable venture, include trappings of professionalism, and establish, at most, a cursory association with other smugglers.
The three goals of individuals or organizations in Phase II reflect a comparatively higher developmental level of individual or group skills and aspirations. This more highly organized individual or group enters into the smuggling venture with the primary goal of obtaining profit, conducting business in a manner that brings creditability to the individual or organization, and establishing contacts crucial to gaining access to the ultimate source or producer of the product. Individuals or organizations that are successful at the second phase may choose to "develop" into Phase-III players once their skill levels and professional contacts warrant inclusion into top corporate positions.
In Phase III, individuals and organizations have extensive successful experience in the smuggling business, have efficient organization that is modified based on business success, and are committed to smuggling as their livelihood.
Figure 1 illustrates the pyramid structure of smuggling behavior. Phase I, the bottom of the pyramid, contains the greatest number of people that incur the highest probability of being caught, possess the least amount of experience, and are the least sophisticated in organization. Individuals in Phase I bring the smallest amount of drugs into a country per trip. Phase II is marked by an improved organizational structure, members that are more likely to expend effort in the development of specialized skills that increase the smuggling efficiency, and expend resources in the development of contacts with brokers that represent drug producers. The distinguishing hallmark of the Phase-II corporate smuggling enterprise is skilled development and establishment of networks. While more developed than individuals and organizations at Phase I, individuals and organizations at Phase II still lack sufficient organization and liquidity to allow profitability and negotiation with the point of origin. Phase-II individuals and organizations are limited to completing the transaction for the product at the point of the warehouse or display, and must use brokers to arrange for transportation. In Phase II, individuals and organizations express concerns with and make determined efforts to correct issues regarding the consistency of conduct and quality of professionalism of the Phase-II smuggling organization. The smuggler interviewed advised that to be included as a Phase-II smuggler, an individual has to deliver the contraband on time every time. Phase III, the highest developmental stage in the DSM, is used to classify highly organized corporate structures that consistently bring the greatest amount of drugs into a country per trip and have members of the organization that engage in specific tasks, i.e., pilots, sea captains, and electronic experts.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Behavioral Characteristics of Phase-I Smugglers
It is important to point out that the pool of data collected in this case study consists of information gathered from interviews with the smuggler that were cross checked for accuracy using available governmental documents and psychological procedures/instruments administered by the examiner. This pool of data was used to construct the DSM. With this in mind, it is noted that a category used in the DSM matches with the work of Adler and Adler (1983; 1990). Adler and Adler profiled a group that matches a Phase-I organization as categorized in the DSM (See Table I).
The group presented by Adler and Adler (1983; 1990) is characterized as a small group of individuals that have pooled their resources, traveled to other parts of the country, occasionally traveled into a foreign country, retrieved contraband such as drugs for their own use, and released the drugs for profit into a small sphere of recreational distribution. The authors point out that those individuals in the group of interest had been raised in similar geographic areas and consider their co-smugglers as friends. The Adler group is marked by a sense of loyalty among its members. The principal association of the group members is to maintain a deviant lifestyle marked by illegal drug abuse/dependency, not to smuggle drugs. The individual behavior in the Adler group is marked by addictions--with common constellations of sex, gambling, spending, and drug and alcohol addictions. In addition to the influencing motive of friends, the second distinguishing attitude in the Adler group is the belief that all drugs should be legalized. In my experience, the members of the Adler group have been the most likely to be caught smuggling.
The Phase-I group has generally not bribed or paid anyone off to assist in their drug smuggling. The Phase-I group structure is not stable over time. The members do not make a living smuggling drugs. Phase-I members tend to predominately smuggle drugs across land. The group will use aircraft only if a particular member of their group has a pilot's license. Phase-I associates have extended periods of time between drug runs. The Phase-I group is most vulnerable to be preyed upon by other drug smugglers and/or conned out of their money by people who are in the smuggling business.
Based on data collected during the course of this case study it is apparent that it is not necessary to be identified or arrested while smuggling or committing a felony to be a member of a Phase-I group. The Phase-I association is without corporate identity, such as a group checking account. Specific personality traits are noted within the Phase-I group. Phase-I members are less likely to be oriented to the foreign country to which they travel for drugs.
Watch for Part Two (the conclusion of this article) in the Spring 2004 Forensic Examiner.
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About the Author
Terrance G. Lichtenwald, Ph.D., is a Life Fellow member with ACFEI. He earned his Doctorate in an American Psychological Association (APA) approved Clinical Psychology program from the California School of Professional Psychology in Fresno. He has a master's degree in Clinical Psychology and School Psychology. He earned his B.S. in Broad Field Social Studies and Psychology. Lichtenwald currently works in a private clinical psychology practice conducting forensic evaluations, clinical/psychological evaluations, security evaluations, psychotherapy and behavioral medicine. He has 15 years of experience in the field. Lichtenwald developed his skills during his pre-doctoral clinical practicums at Fresno Community Hospital and Medical Center and completed an APA pre-doctorate internship at the Veteran's Administration Medical Center in North Chicago. Ill. He has also been employed as the Director of Behavioral Science in the Family Practice Residency with the University of Illinois College of Medicine in Rockford, Ill; Internal Medicine Associates, S.C. in Barrington, Ill; and the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons at the United States Penitentiary in Lompoc, Calif. Among other duties, Lichtenwald was a member of the Special Operations Response Team (SORT). You may contact Dr. Lichtenwald by sending him an e-mail to: TGL3155@aol.com.
TABLE 1 Phase 1 Intelligence More variability, low-average to average full scale 10. Education High school drop-out due to behavior disorders; some col- lege. Criminal Misdemeanor, battery, disor- Record Check derly conduct, juvenile record, DUI. Personality MMPI (1) Test validity/reliability F>, K<, L> MMPI Clinical AAS> APS> MAC-R> Scales Scale 2 sig> Scale 4> (A)> (Do)< (ANG)>(CYN)> (FAM)> (WRK)> (ASP)sig> MMPI Type H (Magargee & Bohn) PAI (2) ALGsig> DRGsig> ANX> DEPsig> AGG> ANT> PAR (bypervig rsntment) DOM< WARM> borderline, negative relations, identity problems, affective instability. Carlson Type 5 or 1 Psych. Survey MCMI III (3) Dependent, antisocial, aggres- sive, sadistic, compulsive, self-defeating, anxiety, alcohol, drug use, borderline. Group Structure Not stable, short term. Group Dynamics Do not need crime to be in a group; many people involved, most friends, some family. Finances No bank accounts. Use of Violence Low use of goal-directed violence, murder of law enforcement and other members low, likely to be a shoot-out situation if law enforcement killed, mules will have been caught with drugs and panicked. Smuggler Only previous model available Mode Type is "Courier," tend to mule drugs. Probability of Most likely to be caught. Being Caught Bribes, Payoffs None. Phase 2 Intelligence Average to above-average full scale 10. Education Most graduate high school, obtain GED, possible technical training in military or technical school. Criminal Misdemeanor, assault, domes. Record Check tic violence, deceptive business practices, military record, disorderly conduct. Personality MMPI Test validity/reliability F>, K<, Ln MMPI Clinical AASsig> APS> Scales MAC-R> Scale 4 sig> Scale 9>(A)>(Do)sig> (ANG)sig>(CYN)> (FAM)> (WRK)> (ASP)sig> MMPI Type G (Magargee & Bohn) PAI (2) ALC> DRG> ANX> DEP> AGGsig> ANTsig> PAR> (hypervig. rsntment) DOM>< WARM>< borderline, negative relations, identity problems, affective instability. Carlson Type 7 Psych. Survey MCMI III (3) Antisocial (moderate), aggressive, sadistic (medium-high), borderline, anxiety, alcohol abuse and drug abuse (not dependency). Group Structure Will not last more than 3-5 years, can deal drugs as well as smuggle. Group Dynamics Need crime to be in o group, more people in group, great- est trust with same culture members, most trust family. Finances Small, local corporations, bank accounts. Use of Violence Will use violence, including murder, as method of management, will kill law enforcement, attempt to control through violence, likely to kidnap and kill law enforcement, will sadistically "burn" officer if he is caught spying on group, will mule but prefers not m, may send for interrogator before killing law enforcement officer, if possible, will hold for short period of time. Smuggler No model available for Mode Type employees, use of drug courter for some ethnic producers. Probability of Mild risk for being caught. Being Caught Bribes, Payoffs Low level government employees, airport managers, lawyers, bankers. Phase 3 Intelligence Average to superior full scale IQ. Education High School graduate, attended college courses, some have college degrees, and/or have worked up through Ore smuggling ranks through a calibrated nepotistic pecking order of power and control. Criminal Domestic violence, deceptive Record Check business practices, most likely no file. Personality MMPI Test validity/reliability F<, K>, L> MMPI Clinical AAS> APS>sig Scales MAC-R> Scale 4sig> Scale 9< Scale 6sig moderate score MMPI Type A (Magargee & Bohn) PAI (2) ALC> DRG><, ANX> DEP> (physical only) PARcig> (hypervig. pers cutn, rsntment) DOMsig> WORMsig< borderline, no self-harm, negative relations, identity problems, affective instability. Carlson Type 11 or 6 Psych. Survey MCMI III (3) Antisocial (high), aggressive, sadistic (high), paranoid, alco- hol and drug use (low), desir- ability gauge significantly ele- vated. Group Structure Long term, will last, do own job only, no drug dealing. Group Dynamics Need crime to be in group and must continue crime to remain trusted; most people in group trust family, distrust other cul- tural groups. Finances Large, multinational corpora- tions, numerous banks, large wire transactions, look for money held in executive-type banking accounts, will use very established banks. Use of Violence Violence is employed to man- age employees and punish- ment, will kill law enforcement as a rule, use sadistic violence, usually order low echelon employee to do murder, how- ever, murder is not considered the only solution to problems, will try other means of influ- ence first, will kidnap and then "debrief" law enforce- ment before brutally killing, have ability to hold office for extended period of time. Smuggle No model available, drug Mode Type courier used as pawn only. Probability of Mild to negligible risk for Being Caught being caught, if caught likely to be related to money issues. Bribes, Payoffs High level military, law enforcement, politicians, own airports and corporations; when transporting contraband will bribe customs, police, mil- itary aware of movement and assist. 1 = Minnesota Mulliplrosic Per sorrolily Inventory-Clinical Stoles 2 = Personality Assessment Inventory 3 = Milton Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III
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