|
Controlling highly pathogenic avian influenza,
Bangladesh.
|
|
|
|
|
| Article Type: | Letter to the editor |
| Authors: |
Mondal, Shankar P. Tardif-Douglin, David Ryan-Silva, Robert Magnani, Rich |
| Pub Date: | 12/01/2012 |
| Publication: | Name: Emerging Infectious Diseases Publisher: U.S. National Center for Infectious Diseases Audience: Academic; Professional Format: Magazine/Journal Subject: Health Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2012 U.S. National Center for Infectious Diseases ISSN: 1080-6040 |
| Issue: | Date: Dec, 2012 Source Volume: 18 Source Issue: 12 |
|
|
|
| Accession Number: | 313345671 |
| Full Text: |
To the Editor: Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1)
virus is a deadly zoonotic pathogen. Since 2003, HPAI infections have
been reported in millions of poultry and wild birds from 63 countries
(1) and in 598 humans, among whom there have been 352 reported deaths in
15 countries (2). HPAI (H5N1) virus is endemic in Bangladesh, and the
first outbreak occurred in March 2007. Since then, the virus has spread
to 49 of 64 districts in Bangladesh, and samples from 536 farms have
tested positive for the virus. Bangladesh now ranks among countries
worldwide with the highest reported number of HPAI outbreaks (1).
Intermittent outbreaks in Bangladesh and clusters of disease across the
border in northeastern India are dramatic reminders that the emergence
of new, mutant viruses in developing countries could lead to a pandemic
among humans. Six cases of nonfatal HPAI (H5N1) infection have been
reported in Bangladesh (2). Live bird markets that are in poor physical
condition and that lack or have poor biosecurity are probable sources of
HPAI transmission to humans and for bird-to-bird transmission (3-5). In 2008, a global project of the United States Agency for International Development, Stamping Out Pandemic and Avian Influenza (STOP AI), was initiated in Bangladesh. The project began with biosecurity training for veterinarians and livestock science graduates on some large-scale commercial farms. The local STOP AI office was established in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, in February 2009, and the organization managed the project through its completion in September 2010 (online Technical Appendix Figure 1, wwwnc.cdc. gov/EID/pdfs/12-0635-Techapp.pdf). STOP AI initially organized 7 highly successful live bird market biosecurity training programs in 5 geographic divisions of Bangladesh; later, STOP AI piloted cleaning and disinfection activities in 2 live bird markets, Mohammadpur and Kaptan Bazaar, in Dhaka by working closely with the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization. The Food and Agriculture Organization subsequently conducted cleaning and disinfection activities in 24 other markets within Dhaka and other districts in Bangladesh. We focused on understanding the inter-relationships among household poultry producers, commercial farmers, suppliers, transporters, processors, and consumers that facilitate the process of producing and moving poultry, i.e., the entire poultry value chain (PVC). We describe how improved biosecurity on poultry farms and hygienic standards in live bird markets can reduce HPAI outbreaks. In resource-limited countries, like Bangladesh, these improvements can be made through training, technical support, financial assistance for infrastructure renovations, and incentivedriven trust-building between service providers and key PVC stakeholders. To determine whether interventions would reduce the number of HPAI infections, we implemented changes during 2009-2010 in 2 districts in Bangladesh, Gazipur and Dinajpur, that had a high number of cases (online Technical Appendix Figure 2). Using field-tested questionnaires, we conducted a baseline survey during in-person interviews with 1,372 poultry stakeholders (Table). Stakeholder workshops were held in each district to share survey findings and design biosecurity improvement programs. STOP AI implemented biosecurity training for 1,319 people in 53 subsector-specific 1-day sessions in Gazipur and Dinajpur (online Technical Appendix Table). We created biosecurity improvement models (e.g., farm boundary, footbath) in 12 commercial farms in Gazipur and selected 2 live bird markets in each dis trict for infrastructure improvements, including biogas and compost plants, that were needed for the cleaning and disinfection activities (online Technical Appendix Figure 3). We provided technical support and [less than or equal to] 25% ($750) of the cost for each farm and [less than or equal to] 50% ($10,000) for each market on a costsharing basis. After completion of all interventions, we conducted a final survey of 514 poultry stakeholders, including 70% of the original trainees from both districts (Table). We analyzed pre- and post-intervention survey data by using GraphPad Software (www.graphpad.com/quickcalcs/index.cfm). The results indicated that awareness of the proper disposal of birds that were culled or died because of HPAI had increased in both districts (p<0.0001); awareness of human HPAI cases rose substantially (p<0.0001); an understanding of how HPAI is spread (e.g., through sick or wild birds) changed (p<0.001); use of personal protective equipment (masks, gloves) and other precautionary measures (washing hands) increased (p<0.0001); awareness of protecting birds from HPAI (e.g., separately housing chickens and ducks) increased (p<0.05); and a preference for purchasing slaughtered birds instead of live birds at the markets increased (p<0.0001). Substantially fewer HPAI outbreaks were reported and no clusters of infection were found during our intervention, 2009-2010 (online Technical Appendix Figure 1), probably indicating that control measures were effective. The challenge now is to sustain the progress that has been made. Several months after completion of the STOP AI interventions, their effect on the incidence of disease in Bangladesh was limited. However, STOP AI could not be expected in the short term to dramatically reduce the high incidence of HPAI in Bangladesh. We have progressively and dramatically increased the scope and benefits of our pilot PVC implementation program, but additional work is needed. To help spread PVC approaches throughout the country, community leaders, imams of local mosques, and school teachers can be trained to implement awareness programs on safe practices for raising poultry and regular cleaning and disinfection of live bird markets. The strengthening of biosecurity measures will help control the spread of HPAI virus and other zoonotic diseases. Acknowledgments We acknowledge Zakaria Noyon and Suman Das-Gupta for providing technical assistance in implementation of the project. We thank Paritosh K. Biswas for assisting with data analysis and for reviewing the manuscript. This project was funded by the United States Agency for International Development. Shankar P. Mondal, David Tardif-Douglin, Robert Ryan-Silva, and Rich Magnani DOI: 10.3201/eid1812.120635 References (1.) World Health Organization for Animal Health. Update on highly pathogenic avian influenza in animals (type H5 and H7) [cited 2012 Mar 19]. http://www.oie. int/animal-health-in-the-world/update-onavian-influenza/2012/ (2.) World Health Organization. Cumulative number of confirmed human cases of avian influenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO [cited 2012 Mar 19]. http://www.who. int/influenza/human_animal_interface/ H5N1_cumulative_table_archives/en/ index.html (3.) Biswas PK, Christensen JP, Ahmed SS, Barua H, Das A, Rahman MH. at al. Avian influenza outbreaks in chickens, Bangladesh. Emerg Infect Dis. 2008;14:1909-12. http://dx.doi.org/10.3201/eid1412.071567 (4.) Biswas PK, Christensen JP, Ahmed SS, Das A, Rahman MH, Barua H, et al. Risk for infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus (H5N1) in backyard chickens, Bangladesh. Emerg Infect Dis. 2009;15:1931-6. http://dx.doi. org/10.3201/eid1512.090643 (5.) Biswas PK, Rahman MH, Das A, Ahmed SS, Giasuddin M, Christensen JP. Risk for highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus infection in chickens in small-scale commercial farms, in a highrisk area, Bangladesh, 2008. Transbound Emerg Dis. 2011;58:519-25. http://dx.doi. org/10.1111/j.1865-1682.2011.01235.x Address for correspondence: Shankar P. Mondal, Department of Veterinary and Biomedical Sciences, College of Veterinary Medicine, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN 55108, USA; email: shankarpm@yahoo.com Table. Analysis of pre- and postintervention survey data for
biosecurity practices for HPAI (H5N1) virus in Gazipur and
Dinajpur districts, Bangladesh, 2009-10 *
No. persons
surveyed (% aware
of practice; 95% CI)
Gazipur
Baseline survey,
Biosecurity practice n = 821
Awareness of bird deaths 191 (23; 21-26)
caused by HPAI
Awareness of bird culling 163 (20; 17-23)
resulting from HPAI
Awareness of HPAI cases among humans 138 (17; 14-20)
Understand how HPAI is spread
Do not know how HPAI is spread 209 (25; 23-29)
Perceive that wild birds are the cause 466 (57; 53-60)
Recognize sick poultry as a vector 43 (5; 4-7)
Awareness of how to protect people
Wear masks 190 (23; 20-26)
Wear gloves 122 (15; 13-17)
Wash hands 207(25; 23-29)
Kids should not handle birds 3 (0; 0.1-1)
No need to protect 243 (30; 27-33)
Awareness of how to protect birds
Separate chickens and ducks 28 (3; 3-4)
Clean and disinfect poultry cages 288 (35; 32-38)
Restrict entry to farms 226 (28; 25-31)
Vaccinate against Newcastle disease 12 (1; 0.8-2)
Properly dispose of feces 158 (19; 17-22)
Wear proper clothing 38 (5; 3-6)
Clean and disinfect transport vehicles 35 (4; 3-6)
Keep dogs and cats away from farms 92 (11; 9-14)
Do not know 170 (21; 18-24)
Bird purchase preference
Dead bird (slaughtered at market) 152 (19; 16-21)
Live bird (slaughtered at home) 652 (79; 77-82)
No. persons
surveyed (% aware
of practice; 95% CI)
Gazipur
Final survey,
Biosecurity practice n = 300 ([dagger])
Awareness of bird deaths 219 (73; 68-78)
caused by HPAI
Awareness of bird culling 186 (62; 56-67)
resulting from HPAI
Awareness of HPAI cases among humans 172 (57; 52-63)
Understand how HPAI is spread
Do not know how HPAI is spread 42 (14; 11-18)
Perceive that wild birds are the cause 207 (69; 64-74)
([double dagger])
Recognize sick poultry as a vector 140 (47; 41-52)
Awareness of how to protect people
Wear masks 204 (68; 63-73)
Wear gloves 136 (45; 40-50)
Wash hands 166(55; 50-60)
Kids should not handle birds 203 (68; 62-73)
No need to protect 0 (0)
Awareness of how to protect birds
Separate chickens and ducks 92 (31; 26-36)
Clean and disinfect poultry cages 182 (61; 55-66)
Restrict entry to farms 131(44; 38-49)
Vaccinate against Newcastle disease 67 (22; 18-27)
Properly dispose of feces 79 (26; 22-32) ([section])
Wear proper clothing 67 (22; 18-27)
Clean and disinfect transport vehicles 105 (35; 30-40)
Keep dogs and cats away from farms 99 (33; 28-39)
Do not know 46 (15; 12-20) ([paragraph])
Bird purchase preference
Dead bird (slaughtered at market) 136 (45; 40-51)
Live bird (slaughtered at home) 167 (56; 50-61)
No. persons surveyed
(% aware of practice; 95% CI)
Dinajpur
Baseline survey,
Biosecurity practice n = 525
Awareness of bird deaths 116 (22; 19-26)
caused by HPAI
Awareness of bird culling 56 (11; 8-14)
resulting from HPAI
Awareness of HPAI cases among humans 21 (4; 3-6)
Understand how HPAI is spread
Do not know how HPAI is spread 286 (54; 50-59)
Perceive that wild birds are the cause 134 (26; 22-29)
Recognize sick poultry as a vector 53 (10; 8-13)
Awareness of how to protect people
Wear masks 44 (8; 6-11)
Wear gloves 54 (10; 8-13)
Wash hands 58 (11; 9-14)
Kids should not handle birds 1 (0; 0.01-1)
No need to protect 294 (56; 52-60)
Awareness of how to protect birds
Separate chickens and ducks 18 (3; 2-5)
Clean and disinfect poultry cages 39 (7; 5-10)
Restrict entry to farms 56 (11; 8-14)
Vaccinate against Newcastle disease 7 (1; 0.6-3)
Properly dispose of feces 16 (3; 2-5)
Wear proper clothing 29 (6; 4-9)
Clean and disinfect transport vehicles 10 (2; 1-4)
Keep dogs and cats away from farms 22 (4; 3-6)
Do not know 267 (51; 47-55)
Bird purchase preference
Dead bird (slaughtered at market) 50 (10; 7-12)
Live bird (slaughtered at home) 484 (92; 90-94)
No. persons surveyed (%
aware of practice; 95% CI)
Dinajpur
Final survey,
Biosecurity practice n = 209 ([dagger])
Awareness of bird deaths 88 (42; 36-49)
caused by HPAI
Awareness of bird culling 47 (22; 17-29)
resulting from HPAI
Awareness of HPAI cases among humans 113 (54; 47-61)
Understand how HPAI is spread
Do not know how HPAI is spread 21 (10; 7-15)
Perceive that wild birds are the cause 154 (74; 67-80)
Recognize sick poultry as a vector 61 (29; 23-36)
Awareness of how to protect people
Wear masks 94 (45; 38-52)
Wear gloves 75 (36; 30-43)
Wash hands 139 (67; 60-73)
Kids should not handle birds 54 (26; 20-32)
No need to protect 4 (2; 0.6-5)
Awareness of how to protect birds
Separate chickens and ducks 36 (17; 13-23)
Clean and disinfect poultry cages 99 (47; 41-54)
Restrict entry to farms 56 (27; 21-33)
Vaccinate against Newcastle disease 47 (22; 17-29)
Properly dispose of feces 117 (56; 49-63)
Wear proper clothing 43 (21; 16-27)
Clean and disinfect transport vehicles 20 (10; 6-14)
Keep dogs and cats away from farms 33 (16; 11-21)
Do not know 2 (1; 0.04-4)
Bird purchase preference
Dead bird (slaughtered at market) 70 (33; 27-40)
Live bird (slaughtered at home) 136 (65; 58-71)
* HPAI, highly pathogenic avian influenza.
([dagger]) Two-sided x test of significance compared with baseline data
had p value of <0.0001, except as noted.
([double dagger]) p = 0.0002.
([section]) p = 0.013.
([paragraph]) p = 0.049. |
| Gale Copyright: | Copyright 2012 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved. |
Previous Article: African swine fever virus, Tanzania,
2010-2012.
Next Article: Hepatitis E virus genotype 3 in shellfish, United Kingdom.
Next Article: Hepatitis E virus genotype 3 in shellfish, United Kingdom.